Reactions to story from The Washington Post

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  14 May SWJ News, Op-Ed, Events & Blog Roundup (Early Edition)

  http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/14-may-swj-news-ope...
  203 days ago in 坓⁊求杯 · Authority: 455

  IRAQ Baghdad: Do You Really Live Here? - Anna Badkhen, Christian Science Monitor Cease-fire Holds in Sadr City After Deadly Clashes - Reuters What Would Really Rebuild Iraq - Rodgers and Yasmeen Alamiri, CSM opinion Iraq Status Report - Iraq Status
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  No End in Sight to Sadr City Resistance

  http://oneutah.org/2008/05/14/no-end-in-sight-to-sadr-city-r...
  202 days ago in One Utah · Authority: 54

  There is still no end in sight after seven weeks of fighting Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Sadr City, reports Bill Roggio on The Long War Journal. U.S. Army units building a three-mile-long wall through Sadr City continue to meet heavy resistance. The attacks occurred during construction on the barrier along Qods Street, the main thoroughfare that divides the southern third of Sadr City from the northern neighborhoods. The US military used air weapons teams armed with Hellfire missiles, Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and infantry to beat back the attacks. What is the fighting about? Sadr’s followers accuse their rivals, especially the Badr Organization, the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), a powerful Shiite party led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, of using the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces in an attempt to alter the balance of political power before provincial elections scheduled for October. The combination of ISCI and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party is known as the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). It remains to be seen if the Sadrists have been weakened or if they have actually gained support among Iraqis by holding ground against a determined offensive by eight U.S. battalions and various units loyal to the Maliki government. Smoke rises from a building hit by a U.S. Hellfire missile in the Shiite enclave of Sadr City in Baghdad, Iraq, Monday, May 12, 2008. The building that was used by insurgent snipers was just north of the 12-foot concrete barrier that is being built along a main street dividing southern Sadr city from north, where Mahdi Army fighters are concentrated. U.S. commanders hope the wall will effectively cut off insurgents ability to move freely around Baghdad and hamper their ability to fire rockets at the Green Zone. (AP Photo/Petr David Josek) One indisputable result of the fighting: hundreds of noncombatant casualties, widespread destruction by air strikes and artillery, and thousands made homeless. Sudarsan Raghavan of the Washington Post offers a glimpse of the plight of civilians displaced by the Sadr City offensive. [T]wo women clad in head-to-toe black abayas walked in clutching two photos of a car riddled with bullet holes, its body crushed. They said U.S. troops had shot at the car, then driven over it with a tank. “My husband was killed,” one of the women said. “I have six kids, and my husband used to be a taxi driver. So what can I do?” A couple of dozen families have found refuge in a soccer stadium that was set up as a temporary camp a week ago by the Maliki government. Most have stayed away because they distrust the regime. “We wish we could go back today to our house,” Sabah said. “But the American soldiers are standing across the street from our house. Once you step out of the house, you will be shot by the snipers.” A widely-heralded May 12 cease-fire agreement between the Sadrists and the UIA has yet to end the fighting, because the U.S. government was not a party to the agreement. In fact, the deal omits any mention of Americans except to warn that “foreign forces” are to have no role in providing security in Sadr City. Aside from a promise to halt the mortar and rocket bombardments of the Green Zone, the Mahdi Army did not commit to stop fighting. They agreed to allow Iraqi units to peacefully enter the city if unaccompanied. For their part, the U.S. military seems determined to continue the offensive for the time being rather than leave Sadr City under the control of an anti-occupation Shiite militia. Previous One Utah post: U.S. Ignoring Sadr City Cease Fire (May 11, 2008) UPDATE: Sadr City conditions worsen, according to a reporter who “asked to remain anonymous because of security concerns.” UPDATE: Michael Gordon of the New York Times reports on the “daily battle of attrition” as the Sadr City wall nears completion. The formal truce that was announced in the Green Zone with great fanfare on Monday has meant nothing here. Shiite militias have been trying to blast gaps in the wall, firing at the American troops who are completing it and maneuvering to pick off the Iraqi soldiers who have been charged with keeping an eye on the partition. American forces have answered with tank rounds, helicopter rocket strikes and even satellite-guided bombs to try to silence the militia fire. On some stretches, the urban landscape has been transformed as the Americans have leveled buildings militia fighters have used as perches to mount their attacks.
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  Retour à Sadr City

  http://coinenirak.wordpress.com/2008/05/15/retour-a-sadr-cit...
  201 days ago in En Vérité · Authority: 12

  Les opérations actuelles à SADR CITY, ce quartier majoritairement chiite situé au NE de Bagdad devenu le fief de Moqtada AL SADR, illustrent bien les procédures militaires de contre-insurrection. Plus particulièrement, elles montrent comme s’opère le contrôle du milieu par des actions de contre-rébellion (visant à perturber l’activité ennemie puis à en détruire l’infrastructure) et de contrôle des populations (visant à obtenir l’allégeance, ou au moins la neutralité, des civils). Deux procédés manifestent la double nature du contrôle du milieu: Physiquement, la construction du mur visant à isoler les parties SO de SADR CITY est une variante du quadrillage mis en oeuvre à FALLOUJAH en 2004 ou à TELL AFAR et AL QAIM en 2005: le grignotage progressif des zones lacunaires par “nettoyage” à partir d’avant-postes puis l’installation de postes de police/points de contrôle des milices. La différence tient dans la méthode: confiner l’ennemi et le détruire de l’extérieur avant de rayonner à partir d’avant-postes situés au coeur des quartiers sous la forme de Joint Security Station (JSS), ici THAWRA I et THAWRA II, qui servent de poste d’alerte pour intervenir dans tout le quartier et qui polarisent l’action d’assistance aux populations. Cela diffère quelque peu du procédé retenu à RAMADI entre juin 2006 et janvier 2007: il avait fallu s’installer en force au sein des quartiers pour créer des avant-postes à partir desquels rayonner. Cela avait occasionné des difficultés puisque les avant-postes attirent les actions offensives de l’ennemi, comme c’est le cas actuellement pour le mur. Psychologiquement, ce contrôle du milieu est obtenu par la mise en place d’actions d’assistance à destination des populations. Ainsi, THAWRA I accueille depuis peu un Centre d’Opérations Civilo-Militaires (CMOC) qui gère les relations avec la population sous tout ses aspects: distribution d’aide alimentaire d’urgence, rétablissement des services essentiels, soins médicaux, négociations avec les responsables tribaux, etc. Le procédé du CMOC date des opérations menées par les Marines à MOGADISCIO en 1993/1993. Il est doctrinalement bien installé puisque qu’on en retrouve à BAGDAD en avril 2003 dès la chute de la capitale, mais aussi à FALLOUJAH après l’assaut initial de novembre 2004. Outre ces fonctions “humanitaires”, le CMOC fonctionne en lien avec la JSS et les postes de police pour établir et mettre à jour des fichiers biométriques. Ainsi, on voit bien que, en dépit des actions “cinétiques” contre les miliciens de l’Armée du Mahdi, l’essentiel de la contre-insurrection repose sur la notion de contrôle du milieu physique et humain à travers l’action exercée sur la population. Celle-ci est donc à la fois le sujet de l’action (puisque on lui procure la sécurité et les services nécessaires) mais aussi l’objet de celle-ci (avec le confinement physique et la cartographie du “terrain humain”). En outre, les actions “cinétiques” -et notamment le degré d’usage de la force- illustrent l’ambivalence de la posture américaine. En effet, la doctrine, les recommandations des supérieurs et les intentions du commandant de théâtre insistent sur la nécessité de demeurer en maîtrise de la violence tout en pouvant éventuellement basculer en mode coercition. En soi, cela ne pose pas de problème, sauf lorsque l’usage de la puissance de feu (par les hélicoptères par exemple), notamment en protection de la force, apparaît indiscriminé. Cela ne sert évidemment pas l’objectif de contrôle des représentations politiques et des allégeances de la population civile. Source

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