Reactions to story from The Yorkshire Ranter

• 

  Meanwhile, in southern Iraq…

  http://www.globaldashboard.org/conflict-and-security/meanwhi...
  194 days ago in Global Dashboard · Authority: 54

  …you may have noticed that all is not well.  The British troops in Basra (both of them) are needless to say staying out of the way.  But as the Yorskhire Ranter reports, …inevitably, the US authorities seem to have swallowed the “southern surge” thing, and are now pressing for more British troops to be sent - not just that, but for an advance back into Basra. This is genuinely bugfuck insane and the Prime Minister has no choice but to reject it; there is literally no-one left. Army planners are already looking at calling out at least 2 Territorial Army [= reservist - ed.] battalions in their entirety to cover routine tasks; a mass of resources is going into Afghanistan; there is some question as to whether there is another brigade in the tubes for the next but one rotation in Iraq. The inter-allied shit just hit the fan. Meanwhile, John Robb reckons that Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army has the ability to shut down, indefinitely, all oil production (a million barrels a day) in southern Iraq. This effort will cost the government tens of millions in revenues for each day of the conflict. It may prove be the most effective means of prematurely terminating Maliki’s offensive. Bill Lind, for his part, thinks that “For about half a year, we have been enjoying something of a lull in the war in Iraq … Events begin to suggest that the lull is ending and Mars is in the ascendant.”  His analysis of what caused the lull, and why it seems set to fracture, is well worth the time. Update: Kevin Drum has thoughtfully provided a cheat sheet on who’s fighting who in Basra - ISCI = SIIC = new name for SCIRI = Badr Corps = “aristocratic” Hakim family = exiles during Saddam Hussein’s reign = pro-Iran = generally in control of army and security forces = pro-U.S. = ally of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his Dawa Party. Mahdi Army = JAM = “firebrand cleric” Muqtada al-Sadr = Iraqi nationalists = originally part of Maliki’s governing coalition but no longer = anti-U.S. = populist/working class orientation = controls much of the oil sector in Basra. “Special groups” = rogue elements of the Mahdi Army = maybe Sadr is just as happy to have Maliki take these guys out for him, but who knows for sure? Fadhila = ex-allies of Sadr = won some elections in Basra in 2005 = smallest of the three Shiite factions in the south.
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  Sciascia, Cockburn, Muqtada

  http://bloodandtreasure.typepad.com/blood_treasure/2008/03/s...
  193 days ago in Blood & Treasure · Authority: 101

  Not quite. The local rents are functionally important, but thinking like Sciascia in Iraq is more than just reducing the thing to economic targets, though those are clearly the proximate spoils. It’s more that the ideas of crime, politics, religion, peace, violence, belief, cynicism, idealism and so on don’t have any kind of institutional integrity or clear distinction between them. The basic political choice available is between power and death, and all things are subordinate to getting more of the first for yourself and more of the second for your enemy. The advantage of spoils like the revenue from Basra port in this scenario is that it does both at the same time, but cherchez les dinars isn’t necessarily the point of the thing. I interviewed Patrick Cockburn this morning about his new book on all things al-Sadr, and I’ll publish the writeup here after it’s out in print. I think the relevant takeout in re Basra and the intra-Shi’te conflicts that have broken out across Southern Iraq is that the Sadrists, as the biggest party of the biggest confessional faction are too big to be defeated, but without Hizbollah-style absolute hegemony over the wider world of political Shi’ism or effective outreach across the sectarian divide, they’re also too small to win. For their rivals in ISCI and Dawa this means that the Sadrists have to be destroyed militarily, since Sadrism is too rooted in the population to be marginalised politically. As things stand, the Jaish also seems to be holding its own pretty well in downtown Basra. This report says that the whole offensive went off half cocked: According to senior sources, the offensive was launched three months before Lt-Gen Mohan had wanted it to, and despite him warning that going in too early would result in the fighting spreading to other Shia strongholds. It was not the first time the general had been at odds with the Baghdad government. Mr Maliki had considered removing him from his post four weeks ago, but desisted after lobbying by the British. British commanders were unaware of the operation until just before it began, although the Iraqi government's national security adviser, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, had spent half an hour discussing the plan with General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, on Saturday evening. This was followed by Mr Maliki ordering two extra Iraqi infantry battalions to Basra that night. …Lt-Gen Mohan was appointed on a rolling three-month contract last July. According to Iraqi sources, the so-called "Iranian faction" surrounding Prime Minister Maliki would not give an 18-month contract to an avowedly secular commander in Basra. His current tenure runs out on 19 April. Mr Maliki is under pressure from those opposed to Lt-Gen Mohan to recall him to Baghdad at that time. Lt Gen Mohan appears to be a member of the Iraq faction in Iraqi politics, which doesn’t get to decide anything. As for the British faction, it was apparently given no notice at all that the latest attack was going to take place and is now being urged to take part in the fighting. Once more, with feeling: time to go home.
• 

  Sciascia, Cockburn, Muqtada

  http://bloodandtreasure.typepad.com/blood_treasure/2008/03/s...
  193 days ago in Blood & Treasure · Authority: 111

  Not quite. The local rents are functionally important, but thinking like Sciascia in Iraq is more than just reducing the thing to economic targets, though those are clearly the proximate spoils. It’s more that the ideas of crime, politics, religion, peace, violence, belief, cynicism, idealism and so on don’t have any kind of institutional integrity or clear distinction between them. The basic political choice available is between power and death, and all things are subordinate to getting more of the first for yourself and more of the second for your enemy. The advantage of spoils like the revenue from Basra port in this scenario is that it does both at the same time, but cherchez les dinars isn’t necessarily the point of the thing. I interviewed Patrick Cockburn this morning about his new book on all things al-Sadr, and I’ll publish the writeup here after it’s out in print. I think the relevant takeout in re Basra and the intra-Shi’te conflicts that have broken out across Southern Iraq is that the Sadrists, as the biggest party of the biggest confessional faction are too big to be defeated, but without Hizbollah-style absolute hegemony over the wider world of political Shi’ism or effective outreach across the sectarian divide, they’re also too small to win. For their rivals in ISCI and Dawa this means that the Sadrists have to be destroyed militarily, since Sadrism is too rooted in the population to be marginalised politically. As things stand, the Jaish also seems to be holding its own pretty well in downtown Basra. This report says that the whole offensive went off half cocked: According to senior sources, the offensive was launched three months before Lt-Gen Mohan had wanted it to, and despite him warning that going in too early would result in the fighting spreading to other Shia strongholds. It was not the first time the general had been at odds with the Baghdad government. Mr Maliki had considered removing him from his post four weeks ago, but desisted after lobbying by the British. British commanders were unaware of the operation until just before it began, although the Iraqi government's national security adviser, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie, had spent half an hour discussing the plan with General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, on Saturday evening. This was followed by Mr Maliki ordering two extra Iraqi infantry battalions to Basra that night. …Lt-Gen Mohan was appointed on a rolling three-month contract last July. According to Iraqi sources, the so-called "Iranian faction" surrounding Prime Minister Maliki would not give an 18-month contract to an avowedly secular commander in Basra. His current tenure runs out on 19 April. Mr Maliki is under pressure from those opposed to Lt-Gen Mohan to recall him to Baghdad at that time. Lt Gen Mohan appears to be a member of the Iraq faction in Iraqi politics, which doesn’t get to decide anything. As for the British faction, it was apparently given no notice at all that the latest attack was going to take place and is now being urged to take part in the fighting. Once more, with feeling: time to go home.

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